Belmont Law Review
Abstract
In Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., the United States Supreme Court held that a state’s application of “consent by registration” comports with due process, provided that the state’s statutory scheme treats business registration as consent to personal jurisdiction. In this Article, Will Lattimore offers a comprehensive fifty-state survey of corporate registration statutes and related appellate decisions to assess how Mallory reshapes the personal jurisdiction landscape. The Article situates “consent by registration” within the broader doctrinal framework of general, specific, and consent-based jurisdiction, tracing the impact of Daimler AG v. Bauman on lower courts’ analyses and explaining how Mallory revives consent as a distinct and constitutionally permissible ground for jurisdiction. Through detailed statutory analysis and a state-by-state classification, Lattimore identifies jurisdictions where consent by registration is clearly established, clearly rejected, or unsettled. The Article concludes that while Mallory resolves federal due process objections, the continued vitality of consent-by-registration doctrines will turn primarily on state statutory interpretation and judicial willingness to revisit post-Daimler precedent.
Recommended Citation
Lattimore, Will
(2024)
""Consent by Registration" After Mallory--A Fifty State Summary,"
Belmont Law Review: Vol. 12:
Iss.
1, Article 2.
Available at:
https://repository.belmont.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss1/2