Law Faculty Scholarship
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-2020
Abstract
This Article examines the growing global reliance on plea bargaining and challenges the foundational assumption that innocent defendants do not plead guilty absent coercion. Through a comparative analysis of the United States, Japan, and South Korea—jurisdictions at different stages of formalizing plea bargaining—the authors combine doctrinal review with cross-cultural laboratory experiments to assess the prevalence of false guilty pleas and false testimony induced by plea incentives. The findings demonstrate that a significant number of innocent participants are willing to plead guilty in exchange for leniency and, critically, to provide false testimony implicating others to secure favorable outcomes. These tendencies persist across distinct legal systems and cultural contexts, suggesting that the risks associated with bargained justice are not system-specific but instead reflect broader human decision-making dynamics under pressure. The Article concludes that existing procedural safeguards may be insufficient to mitigate the innocence problem inherent in plea bargaining regimes and calls for renewed scrutiny of plea-based adjudication systems worldwide.
Recommended Citation
Andrew M. Pardieck et al, Bargained Justice: The Rise of False Testimony for False Pleas, 44 Fordham Int'l L.J. 469 (December 2020).
