Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Spring 2020

Abstract

This article examines the procedural and remedial barriers to recognizing artificial intelligence (AI) as a legal author under the Copyright Act of 1976 by shifting the focus from doctrinal authorship debates to questions of liability. While much scholarship has explored whether AI can satisfy originality and creativity requirements, the authors argue that a critical feature of authorship—susceptibility to suit for infringement—has been largely overlooked. The article analyzes civil procedure challenges that would arise if an AI were named as a defendant, including personal jurisdiction, domicile, service of process, due process protections, and venue. It further evaluates the feasibility of traditional copyright remedies—actual damages, statutory damages, and injunctive relief—concluding that such remedies are either impracticable or unenforceable against AI systems. Because AI lacks legal personhood, assets, and meaningful capacity for compliance, infringement actions against AI would often fail for want of an adequate remedy. The authors ultimately contend that these procedural and remedial deficiencies provide strong justification for limiting copyright authorship to humans or human-controlled entities.

Download

Share

COinS