Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-2017

Abstract

This Article examines the procedural due process implications of Executive Order 13769, the 2017 “travel ban,” within the broader historical framework of Supreme Court immigration jurisprudence. Although the Ninth Circuit suggested that the Order might violate procedural due process, the Article argues that such a claim, even if successful, would offer limited substantive protection. Tracing the development of the plenary power doctrine from Chae Chan Ping through Knauff, Mezei, Fleuti, Plasencia, and Zadvydas, the Article demonstrates that procedural due process in immigration law has historically been constrained by deference to the political branches. Even when courts recognize that due process applies—particularly to lawful permanent residents—the level of process required is often minimal and heavily shaped by congressional design. Thus, the Article contends that prevailing on procedural due process grounds in the context of immigration restrictions may amount to a symbolic victory that leaves the underlying structure of executive and legislative dominance largely intact.

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