Document Type

Article

Publication Date

5-2018

Abstract

This article examines whether informing defendants about the collateral consequences of criminal convictions influences their decisions to plead guilty, particularly when those future sanctions compete with the immediate incentive of release from pretrial detention. Drawing on prospect theory and temporal discounting theory, the authors hypothesize that delayed collateral consequences will exert limited influence when weighed against certain and immediate gains, such as freedom from jail. Across two experimental studies manipulating guilt status, pretrial detention, and the presentation of collateral consequences, results demonstrate that actual guilt strongly predicts plea decisions, but pretrial detention significantly increases the likelihood of guilty pleas—especially among innocent participants. In contrast, knowledge of collateral consequences generally fails to deter guilty pleas, suggesting that future ramifications are heavily discounted when immediate liberty is at stake. The findings highlight the powerful role of pretrial detention in shaping plea outcomes and raise concerns about the diagnostic value of guilty pleas in a system dominated by negotiated resolutions.

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