Belmont University Research Symposium (BURS)

Symmetry in Preemption Games: Econometric Analysis and Game-Theoretic Results

Publication Date

Spring 3-28-2003

College

Business, Jack C. Massey College of

Department

Economics and Finance

BURS Faculty Advisor

Dustin J. Rumbaugh

Presentation Type

Oral Presentation

Abstract

Economic games are often said to be symmetrical if they look the same to all players. That is, no player can profitably deviate in strategy unless their competitors can do the same. This presentation investigates one class of economic games, Preemption Games, where each player is an investor assigned private costs. All investors attempt to irreversibly buy into a market simulated by geometric Brownian motion, closing the opportunity to all other competitors who failed to do so, and receiving the entire payoff. In defining symmetry for such games, it is useful to look for the presence of inherently strong conditions: spy-proof (SP) mechanisms that prevent advantageous information gains, anonymity, and single-orbit symmetry groups containing all players. By way of inferential statistical analysis, these strong conditions for symmetry will be sought after, and the application of econometric techniques will provide insights into game-theoretic results.

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