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**The Ghost of Populism:
Haunting the Demos in Democracy**

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Honors Thesis
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Question, Thesis, Variable, Hypothesis

Several recent elections demonstrate voters across advanced industrial economies support candidates with a populist agenda. We observe this phenomenon, for example, in the election of Donald J. Trump as president of the United States as well as across the Atlantic through the majority of voters in the UK favoring the UK Independence Party's call to leave the European Union and return to a nationally focused agenda through Brexit. Europe allows us to be vividly aware of voter support for populist agendas through their multi-party systems, which include political parties who openly and explicitly claim a populist agenda, such as the populist radical right Sweden Democrats who won 5.7 percent of the vote, crossing the parliamentary electoral threshold and the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) in Italy who won no less than 25.6 percent of the vote in the 2013 parliamentary election. As noted by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018) in their report "Populists in Power Around the World," these close, aggressive, or successful political races and movements have redirected the space where populism receives inquisitive attention from academic discussions to mainstream media. This paper attempts to join a conversation that now effectively spans both the academic world across many disciplines, as well as the world of mainstream media and dinner conversations, by shedding light on what national conditions produce such widespread 'popular' support for populist agendas such as "Making America Great Again" and "Keeping Sweden Swedish."

The most attention-grabbing feature of modern right-wing populist movements to the mainstream media and their audiences is often their ethnocentric or nationalistic rhetoric. Calls for keeping immigrants out and returning land to "native" statesmen dominate the stage that presents populist agendas to the public. But is this rise in votes cast for candidates and parties that promote nationalist agendas really caused by a rise in ethnocentric ideals among voters? Or are there causal variables beneath such sentiments that are simply not as interesting to report or easily indicated in soundbites or slogans? Kyle and Gultchin (2018) found that the most recent rise in populism is not occurring in developing democracies as we have most prominently observed in the past, but in states that are firmly established in their democratic systems of governance and participation on the global stage. Does this suggest that developed nations are sliding backward into tribalism and protectionism? Or are these human reactions some version of self-defense against threatening forces? This paper attempts to explore the reactionary nature of populism by measuring variables that may explain the ease with which populist agendas have been able to collect support.

Kyle and Gultchin (2018), in their report "Populists in Power Around the World," note that populism is often regarded as a destructive and threatening force that directs aggressions at the parts of democratic institutions that keep things free, equal, and running smoothly. However, populists are often not wrong in directing attention to broken promises and ineffective structures

in institutions such as the media, judiciary, and independent governmental agencies. Populist movements provide reactionary finger-pointing where flaws in the established political system have become depoliticized or swept under the rug for years, promising nothing but “far-reaching solutions” (Kyle and Gultchin, 2018, pg 6). Being able to ask for reform, indicate distrust, and acknowledge institutional frustrations are essential to the purpose of democratic parties and leadership. As Kyle and Gultchin (2018) note, “The problem with populists is that they raise these issues as a means of riling their base and dividing societies” (pg 6). Populist agendas are fueled by the truth that critique and promotion of interests have very real places in politics that are often underrealized. However, the solutions populist agendas promote are what Kyle and Gultchin (2018) call “fantasies, characterized by vague ideas and unfulfillable promises” (p. 6). Donald Trump can promise a border wall, but he cannot promise an end to the immigration from the Southern Hemisphere and elsewhere that the United States will continue to experience as a result of globalization.

The objective of my research is to determine what national conditions produce a rise in support amongst voters for candidates with a populist agenda. I will use the independent variables: (1) immigration, (2) bargaining power among the working class, (3) economic impacts of globalization on employment in the manufacturing industry and, (4) cost of living as demonstrated by the Consumer Price Index to investigate their effect on my dependent variable: a rise in populism. I incorporate these variables to test the following hypotheses:

H1: A decrease in union membership will cause a rise in populism.

H2: An increase in the percentage of the immigrant share of the total United States population combined with an increase in the cost of living and a decrease in the number of manufacturing jobs will cause a rise in populism.

H0: Union membership, fluctuations in share of the total population as immigrants, changes in the cost of living, and the number of manufacturing jobs do not contribute to national conditions that affect a rise in populism.

Through this study, I attempt to shed light on the meaning behind the rise in populism as we see demonstrated in votes cast for candidates promoting populist agendas in present-day elections and an increase in the discussion of populism by working to understand the conditions that produced the vote, support, and spotlight. I theorize that a combination of the economic impacts, cultural impacts, and a decline in bargaining power due to globalization cause a rise in support for populist agendas.

Literature Review- Defining Populism and its Observable Implications

There has been a significant spike in the frequency of discussion, not only about the emergence of populism but simply regarding how to define and observe it. How do we catch this beast? What does it look like when we do? Noury and Roland (2020) observe that the Web of Science databases has jumped from including a mere average of 95 papers and books per year with the words populism and populist in the title before 2016, to 266 in 2016 and steadily rising to 615 by 2018 (p. 422). They note this is not just a discussion amongst political scientists but among academic researchers ranging from sociologists to historians, economists, and communication scientists. It is important to recognize that this robust list of fields and researchers who have contributed to the description of populism as a phenomenon is an indication that the causal variables of populism's rise are, like most political reactions, very human. Populism is a vehicle. Like all political ideologies, it is a place to rally around and a way to communicate to the government what is working about the way we govern society and what is not. As Yotam Margalit (2019) points out in the opening of his article "Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered," there is no one definition of populism (p. 152). I agree with his notation that a chief reason for the difficulty in pinning down a standard definition of populism is that those who prescribe to the belief, unlike those of other belief systems described in "isms" (such as communism or socialism) rarely self-identify to doing so (Margalit, 2019, p.152). This means we must look closely, not at a systematically replicable agenda, but perhaps the nature of agenda, looking to see whether or not it provides people an affirming place to express frustrations the rest of society often pretends either do not exist or do not view as a big enough deal to wreck home about.

In his book *Populism*, Paul Taggart (2000) identifies six key defining themes of populism. First, that it is hostile towards representative politics; second, that it identifies with an idealized 'heartland;' third, that it lacks core values; fourth, that it is a reaction to a sense of crisis; fifth, that it is self-limiting and episodic; and, finally, that it has a 'chameleonic' character (Taggart, 2000, p. 2). Taggart, therefore, maintains Margalit's (2019) belief that populism is a belief system without identifiable beliefs. Taggart's (2000) conclusions continue to differentiate our working definition of populism from the mainstream connotation of the word today, which indicates populism is a belief system that can be identified by its racist stripes and exclusionary coloring; however, his observation that populism "identifies with an idealized 'heartland'" helps to give such mainstream observations a place, or understand where they manifest from.

Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde (2004) defines populism as an ideology that rests on the belief that society is divided into two "homogenous and antagonistic" groups, the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite," and that politics should be "an expression of the *volonte generale* (general will) of the people (p. 543)." This clearly implies the adherents of populism are the common man, that the 'pure people' are not the elite, but that the elite should answer to them.

This develops our definition of populism to recognize the reaction that is populism takes place among the "common people" when they feel they have been wronged by those in power. Cas Mudde's definition does not include a separation between pure people and immigrants, or pure people and people of a different race than them; his definition pits common versus elite, which I will carry as an important component of populism's observable implications.

Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (2008), however, expand the definition of populism to be a dynamic between *three* groups, calling it an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites as well as against a group of dangerous "others" who are "together seen as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice" (p. 3). I believe this addition of a third group is an important contribution, like Taggart's contribution of the 'idealized heartland, in giving the mainstream sentiments about populism's exclusionary nature a place.

Each of these definitions suggest populism can be boiled down to be an observable reaction by a group of people who feel they are, as sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016) would put it, *strangers in their own land*. In their report "Populists in Power Around the World," Kyle and Gultchin (2018) of The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change echo such sentiments, that populism at its root is a reaction among people who are not being heard in their home, defining populism as a belief that makes two primary claims; first, that "a country's true people are locked into conflict with outsiders, including establishment elites" and second, that "nothing should constrain the will of the true people" (p.5). Kyle and Gultchin (2018), however, also identify three types of populism that can be differentiated from one another, primarily by how populist leaders frame the said conflict between the 'true people' and the outsiders. Understanding that these three types are shaped by who the leader of the 'party' is at the time, is key to understanding how populism survives without core beliefs. As we noted in Taggart's (2000) definition, populism's 'chameleonic' nature is central to its character; these three types of populism paint broad pictures of three colors populism commonly takes.

The first, cultural populism, defines the "true" people as the native members of the nation-state, and outsiders as either immigrants, criminals, ethnic and religious minorities, or cosmopolitan elites (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018, p. 7). Kyle and Gultchin (2018) assert that "cultural populism tends to emphasize religious traditionalism, law and order, sovereignty, and painting migrants as enemies" (p. 7). The second type, socio-economic populism, claims that the "true" people are "honest, hard-working members of the working class" and outsiders include "big business, capital owners, and actors perceived as propping up an international capitalist system" (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018, p. 7). The third type, anti-establishment populism, paints the "true" people as "hardworking victims of a state-run by special interests" and outsiders as political elites (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018, p. 7). Kyle and Gultchin (2018) note that "although all forms of populism rail against political elites, anti-establishment populism distinguishes itself by focusing on

establishment elites as the primary enemy of the people and does not sow as many intra-society divisions” (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018, p. 7). I hypothesize that these three types of populism, cultural, socio-economic, and anti-establishment, indicate three areas where causal variables of the rise of populism can be observed.

Stijn Van Kessel (2015) provides a clear criterion for the categorizing of agendas as populist or not, asserting that “a party may be defined as populist if it (1) portrays ‘the people’ as virtuous and essentially homogeneous; (2) advocates popular sovereignty, as opposed to elitist rule, and (3) defines itself as against the political establishment, which is alleged to act against the interest of the people” (p. 13). As a part of my literature review and research in the process of developing my dependent variable, my measure of populism, I studied Van Kessel’s (2015) book, *Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent?*, in which he identifies populist parties using primary sources such as party manifestos and speeches. As I have selected the United States across time as my case study, I noted Van Kessel’s (2015) discussion of the newspapers being consistent monitors of popular support or interest in populism. I, therefore, credit him with my decision to use the New York Times word count per year of the word “populism” as my dependent variable.

Literature Review- Observing Populism and Theorizing the Conditions that Produce It

The existing literature on populism primarily attributes its rise in its support to three things: social media and the internet, economic disadvantages, and cultural disruptions. I have found that all three of these causal explanations can be linked to the globalization theory, which asserts that we are moving away from the nation-state and toward multinational leadership through the growth of international trade, the increasingly global movement of people, the increase in the number of international laws and forums, economic liberalism, and the rise of advancement in information technologies, such as the internet and global digital communication networks (Flew 2020). I theorize that globalization produces national conditions which allow those who feel left behind to actually become further left behind, and then to easily connect and organize with those who find themselves in similarly disadvantaged situations (emotionally, financially, culturally, physically, etc.).

I began my research intrigued by the theory of the first camp, those attributing the rise of populism to social media and the internet. While populism as a belief system is social media’s senior by many generations, and can therefore be easily dismissed as a causal variable if the null hypothesis is considered (Hitler did not have a Twitter) I see merit in the camp of scholars’ research and arguments that social media and the internet provide uniquely fertile ground for the planting of a populist agenda. Social media and the internet further remove the elite or any hand in controlling the dissemination of information; a phenomenon which I believe can be argued for each degree of innovation we have experienced in information technology, such as the printing

press, telephone, radio, and television. As discussed in the introduction, there is also a newfound rise in the frequency of discussion of populism in general that would support the invention of the internet and social media as a causal catalyst. The Google Ngramer indicates an exponential increase in the use of the word populism, making its sharpest rise from 2009 to the present.

In his article, "Digital Media and the Entrenchment of Right-Wing Populist Agendas," Ralph Schroeder (2018) explores the causal relationship between populist candidates' success and their social media platforms. Using the United States and Sweden as case studies, Schroeder (2018) takes a closer look at the role digital media has played in recent elections where populist agendas saw prominent promotion and electoral success. Schroeder (2018) argues that a purely economic explanation for the rise in populism is insufficient, as he observes, like Kyle and Gultchin (2018) note, that we are seeing a rise in populism in places that are not experiencing economic crises as well as among those groups within states who are not the most economically disadvantaged of the population (Schroeder, 2018, p. 62). He instead argues the recent rise of populism is a result of the "exclusion" piece of the definitions discussed above- the feeling among those who cast their vote for a populist candidate that they must defend themselves as 'the people' from the outsiders (elites and others). It is helpful to consider Kyle and Gultchin's (2018) anti-establishment classification in Schroeder's (2018) presentation. Schroeder (2018) asserts that social media provides the perfect tool for populist candidates to begin to achieve success by allowing them to "bypass the conventional gatekeepers of journalists and mainstream TV and newspapers," giving them an opportunity they previously lacked to extend their reach into the mainstream conversation (p. 65). For example, Schroeder (2018) cites Trump's use of Twitter as a necessary factor in his receiving the Republican nomination in the 2016 United States Presidential race (p. 62). Trump's use of Twitter allowed him to promote himself directly to the public, defend his own soundbites, and separate himself from traditional media outlets, while still receiving their coverage, therefore making himself a legitimized candidate in the eyes of both those who receive information about their political candidates through traditional media outlets, as well as those who adhere to populism and refuse to trust traditional media, considering it a part of the mistrusted "establishment." In his article "Populism, globalisation, and social media," Terry Flew (2020) similarly explores the role social media has played in the rise of populism we have seen since the 2010s. Flew (2020) frames the leveraging of social media by political candidates in the era of "post-truth politics," a term recognized by the Oxford Dictionary as the word of the year in 2016 (the year of Donald Trump's election and Brexit), which refers to circumstances in which people respond more to feelings and beliefs than to facts. Flew (2020), similarly to Schroeder (2018), names social media as a causal variable in the rise of populism due to the opportunities platforms such as Facebook and Twitter provide to bypass the mainstream media. Unlike Schroeder (2018), who focuses on this enabling power in the hands of populist leaders (such as Trump's use of Twitter), Flew (2020) hones in on the ability social media and the internet provide to the "people" to bypass the mainstream media's "frequently liberal-cosmopolitan stance" (p. 8). According to Flew (2020), social media and the internet

provide a place where people who share grievances regarding lost faith in free-market capitalism and a distrust of the government to protect them from its consequences can make direct and frequent contact (p. 9). They can therefore rally and organize, accelerating the spread of nationalism and amplifying the voices who share its sentiments (Flew 2020).

In his article “Post-Populism in Zambia: Michael Sata’s rise, demise, and legacy,” Alastair Fraser (2017) identifies Zambia’s media having left space for opposition to be one of the key national conditions that allowed for the electoral success of the populist Patriotic Front Party’s theatrical leader, Michael Sata. Fraser (2017) notes that “increasing mobile phone ownership allowed politicians to build an unmediated dialogue with voters through call-in radio shows,” giving them a means of capturing the trust of the people, making those with unanswered grievances regarding a depressed and unequal economy feel heard (p. 457).

Fraser’s findings, in a way, combine the assertions of Flew (2020) and Schroeder (2018), noting that innovations in information technology not only allow populist candidates to bypass the traditional media in their messages, or the “people” to connect with one another, but for the candidates and “the people” to connect with each other. This is also an example of not only social media and the internet being detected as causing the rise in support for populist agendas, but advancements in information and communication technology in general giving rise to populist support. Fraser’s (2017) findings regarding why cell phones and radio caused a rise in populism is reflective of Schroeder’s (2018) findings regarding the causal relationship between social media and the rise of populism, indicating that while many social scientists have specifically concentrated recent studies on the internet and social media, innovations in information technology, in general, maybe a more accurate causal variable.

In his book, *The New Class War*, Michael Lind (2020) proposes this rise in feelings of support for populism, as demonstrated in the United States and the United Kingdom, are the result of a growing class gap. His work falls into two camps, those who attribute the rise in populism to cultural disruptions as well as those who attribute its rise to economic disruptions. He proposes we are living in a second class war, the first of which was produced by industrialization and its creation of two classes, the “industrial or service workers” and the “bourgeois capitalists, later joined by the university-credentialed managers and professionals” (Lind, 2020, p. xi). Lind (2020) theorizes that the first class war was diffused at the hand of what he describes as “democratic pluralism” (p. 5). He asserts that grassroots party politicians, trade union and farm association leaders, and church leaders successfully bargained with national elites for power in three realms, respectively: government, the economy, and the culture, giving the feeling that we have noted fuels populism, such as belonging, voice, involvement, and priority among their government, a place to be channeled (Lind, 2020, p. 10). Lind (2020) argues that since the 1960s, governments of industrialized nations have declined in their interest to bargain for power with the working class, resulting in a drawn-out period of feeling greater and greater neglect from

their government. While Lind's (2020) theory is primarily applied to the United Kingdom and the United States in his research, I believe this theory of a growing class gap and the cultural disruptions it causes, creating the necessary conditions in a nation to move voters to elect a leader with a populist agenda, translates to the observed rise of populism across advanced industrial economies that we see today. Lind's (2020) observations help us understand where the consolidated momentum that gives rise to populism originates from. I theorize that when populism is on the rise, it is because other channels of organization and expression are on the decline, bringing left behind groups together under the shared sentiments of frustration and distrust.

Anne Case and Angus Deaton (2017) similarly argue that there is an identifiable group of individuals who have been left behind as a result of a growing class gap since the 1960s and 70s. They, however, identify a trend perhaps more morbid than the prospect of Orwellian-style class war: an existing trend of steadily negatively reversed life expectancy among non-Hispanic white Americans (Deaton and Case 2017). Case and Deaton (2017), like Lind (2020), identify a college education to be a ticket into a new upper class in both Europe and America. Lind (2020) identifies this diploma ticket to send you to work and allow you to participate in almost all government, business, media, and nonprofit industries (while lacking one bars you from such participation) (p. 6), while Case and Deaton (2017) identify a lack of a college education as an anchor, keeping individuals in a process of "cumulative disadvantage" that, since 2014, has been marked by a number of "deaths of despair" (drug poisoning, suicide, and alcohol poisoning) (p.398). I am interested in Case and Deaton's (2017) work as it is a deeper dive into the lives of those who make up the majority of the populist vote. While many social scientists have explored economic threat and insecurity as the causal factor of the rise in populism, political scientists such as Yotam Margalit (2019) argue the "these accounts overstate the role of economic insecurity in explaining the populist vote" (p.153). These "deaths of despair" indicate a rise in a feeling of hopelessness that I believe amplifies the assertions made by researchers, such as Lind (2020), who note a decline in a voice as a causal variable in the rise in populism.

Another voice contributing significantly to the conversation regarding the conditions that produce support for populism is that of Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016, 2018). Hochschild's (2018) book, *Strangers in Their Own Land* is the product of her research as a sociologist in rural Louisiana over the course of five years studying a Tea Party stronghold. The goal of her research was to understand how Trump supporters were feeling. She set out to learn the narrative of their lives and understand their stark positioning against the liberalization of government despite their socio-economic positions that would suggest acceptance of governmental assistance could be extremely beneficial. Her findings fall into the camp which attributes the rise in populism to cultural disruptions, noting that supporters of populism feel they are falling further into situations of suffering as groups such as the LGBTQ community, ethnic minorities, and women, cut in line

for attention in the media and among policymakers, despite their historic hard work and determination to take care of business.

Robert Wuthnow (2019) set out with a similar goal as Hochschild (2018) when he conducted his research that produced his book, *The Left Behind: Decline and Range in Small-Town America*. Wuthnow (2018) visited hundreds of rural communities, studying their history and collecting information about them from surveys, election results, exit polls, censuses, business statistics, and municipal records to broaden his understanding of the context of their rise in populist support. He concluded that the leading explanation for the growing rural-urban political divide in the United States is that rural citizens were suffering disproportionately economically. He also places his conclusions firmly in the camp of cultural explanations, asserting that the populist vote can also be attributed to widely racist and misogynist beliefs among rural populations. I found this to be a commonly held theory among researchers regarding the causal variables of populism; however, during my research, I heard Michael Lind challenge a fellow political scientist who held such a theory, E. J. Dionne on the NPR podcast, “On Point,” asking him “if all citizens who cast a vote for a populist candidate had a moral conversion tomorrow, do you believe that we would have a one-party system in America?” (Chakrabarti, 2020). I have considered this question constantly in my theorizing and find the negative conclusion to be compelling.

The existing literature concerning the rise of populism has led me to believe that observation of one such variable in the lives of voters is not the answer, but instead a mixture of variables that create national conditions reflecting a growing gap between the working class population and those who belong to an elite class.

Data Collection and Case Selection

To understand whether a rise in populism is caused by the impacts of globalization on the economy, working-class bargaining power, jobs in the manufacturing industry, and immigration, I have selected the United States every year between the years of 1939 and 2017 as the seventy-eight cases in which I will test my hypotheses. The United States between 1939 and 2017 as a sample of the population of democratic states who have experienced a fluctuation in populist support, allows me to control for consistent state collected data and English as the language in which populism is mentioned in primary news sources while avoiding selection bias by including a random sampling of the United States over time.

In operationalizing my hypothesis, I will use the following variables and gather data from the following sources:

Dependent Variable:

To measure the dependent variable, the level of the presence of populism as an ideology, I will use the frequency of usage of the word populism, measured by the raw number of times the word “populism” was used in all publications of the New York Times per year between the years of 1939 and 2017. I have collected this data by conducting an advanced search in the ProQuest archives of the New York Times, which contains every issue of the publication’s history, beginning in 1851 (ProQuest, 2021).

Independent Variables:

To measure the weight of bargaining power among the working class, I have selected union membership as represented by the density of the total share of employees in industries in which unions are organized in the United States as a percentage. I have used data collected and compiled by the Economic Policy Institute, specifically from a data set entitled “Union membership rate and share of income going to the middle 60 percent of families 1917-2017” (Economic Policy Institute, 2017).

To measure the fluctuation of manufacturing jobs in the United States, I have used data collected and compiled by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data used to represent this independent variable comes from the data set “All employees, thousands, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted” (United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). I have specifically used the twelve-month percentage change in the total number of manufacturing jobs in the United States annually from the years 1939 to 2017.

To measure the cost of living as an independent variable, I have used the Consumer Price Index (CPI), a measure that records the weighted average of prices of a specified selection of consumer goods and services, such as transportation, food, medical care, and education. It is calculated by taking price changes for each item in the predetermined selection of consumer goods and averaging them, giving a picture of the change over time in the prices paid for such goods. I have used the data set compiled by the U.S. Inflation Calculator who has calculated the annual percent change of CPI data recorded by the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (2021) from 1913- February of 2021.

And finally, to measure immigrants as a share of the total population as an independent variable, I have used data collected and compiled by the Migration Policy Institute. I have specifically utilized the data set titled “Number of Immigrants and Their Share of the Total U.S. Population, 1850-2019,” using the percentage of the total population of United States that is recorded as immigrants, referring to people residing in the United States who were not U.S. citizens at birth (including naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, certain legal nonimmigrants who

hold a visa, those admitted under refugee or asylee status, and persons illegally residing in the United States) (Migration Policy Institute, 2019).

Test and Results

The collected data was then analyzed using multiple linear regression in the statistical software SPSS to determine whether a decrease in union membership combined with an increase in the percentage of the immigrant share of the total United State’s population, as well as an increase in the cost of living and a decrease in the number in the number of manufacturing jobs cause a rise in populism. The regression model has been checked for the following assumptions: a linear relationship, multivariate normality, no multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity. The results of the model are depicted in the summary charts below.

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.811 ^a	.658	.590	17.052

a. Predictors: (Constant), Union membership, % Change in US Manufacturing Jobs, Percent CPI, Immigration

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	146.173	34.890		4.190	.000
	Immigration	-3.378	2.567	-.248	-1.316	.203
	Percent CPI	.704	1.018	.102	.691	.497
	% Change in US Manufacturing Jobs	-3.030	11.644	-.037	-.260	.797
	Union membership	-3.978	.751	-.895	-5.296	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Populism mentioned in the NYT

The overall model fit was $R^2 = .658$. To determine whether the association between populism and each independent variable are statistically significant, the p-value for each independent variable was compared to the significance level to assess the null hypothesis. Using a significance level of .05 (indicating a 5% risk that an association exists where there is no actual association, or in other words, a 95% confidence interval that a relationship does exist), I am able to conclude that the only strong and statistically significant relationship within the model is an association between union membership (with a p-value of .000) and the discussion of populism,

affirming my primary hypothesis that a decrease in union membership will cause a rise in populism. Looking at the standardized beta coefficients, I can conclude that, for every one positive increase in union membership, there is a .895 decrease in the discussion on populism.

The model shows that immigration as a percentage of the total United States population (with a p-value of .203), the cost of living as represented by the Consumer Price Index (with a p-value of .497), and a change in the number of manufacturing jobs (with a p-value of .797) are statistically insignificant causal variables of a rise in populism, as I cannot reject the null hypothesis that any of the three do not have an effect on the discussion of populism.

Conclusions and Implications

Union membership being the only statistically significant causal variable as a national condition that affects the discussion of populism in the model suggests that a rise in populism is indeed a response to a rechanneling of organized voice, concern, and bargaining power among the working class from grassroots organizations to political organization. The statistical insignificance among the share of immigrants as a percentage of the United States population suggests cultural dispositions (such as racism or xenophobia), as often discussed among commentators and theorists of the conditions that produce populism, are not strong arguments for individuals' reasoning for supporting and discussing populism, as the null hypothesis that says national conditions that would cause cultural disruptions (such as a decline in the linguistic or religious majority) cannot be rejected. The model suggests a rise in populism does not have to do with economic hardship felt by a decline in industrial or manufacturing jobs due to the globalization of the labor market, or a decrease in wages due to an influx of immigrant labor, but instead with a decline in voice to express concern, hurt, or protection.

In conclusion, I theorize that when populism is on the rise, it is because other channels of organization and expression are on the decline, bringing left behind groups together under the shared sentiments of frustration and distrust.

Recommendations for Further Research

In conducting my literature review, I noticed a strong body of research attributing the rise in populism to social media and the internet. While many social scientists have specifically concentrated recent studies on the internet and social media, my research regarding the history of technological innovations in communication technology led me to hypothesize there is a relationship present between the extension of reach and speed in communication technology and the national conditions that produce a rise in populism, leading me to believe that innovation in communication technology may be a more accurate causal variable. Constraints in existing data, time, and resources restricted me from being able to test such a hypothesis; however, I believe

this paper indicates a reason to explore a causal relationship between innovations in communication technology and a rise in populism.

Constraints in time, resources, and existing data also prevented me from honing in on a precise measure of the cultural impacts due to immigration on the rise of populism. I would propose exploring the causal relationship between a rise in the percentage of the United States population classified as being of limited proficiency in English, or a decline in the protestant religious majority.

Lastly, I would most prominently suggest further research be conducted regarding other sources of bargaining power among the working class, such as religious organizations, grassroots organizations, and specific working-class labor organizations.

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